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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 11-1885
_____________
JAMES CHIZMAR;
MARIANNE CHIZMAR,
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF TRAFFORD; KEVIN KARAZSIA;
FRANK BRUNO; BRIAN LINDBLOOM; CRAIG ALEXANDER
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Western Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00188)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
______
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 5, 2011
Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 5, 2011)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
I.
Appellants James Chizmar (“Mr. Chizmar”) and Marianne Chizmar (“Mrs.
Chizmar”) appeal from the District Court‟s order granting the appellees‟ motions for

summary judgment. The Chizmars argue the District Court erred in concluding that: (1)
no reasonable jury could conclude the appellants were retaliated against based on their
constitutionally-protected conduct; (2) no official decision was adopted by the Borough
to retaliate against the appellants; and (3) the elements of the Pennsylvania claims for
wrongful use of civil proceedings and malicious prosecution were not satisfied. We have
considered all of the appellants‟ arguments, but find no basis for reversal and will affirm.
II.1
We write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and
procedural history of this case, which is set forth in the District Court‟s opinion. The
action arises from the events that ensued after an area of land within the Borough of
Trafford, known as “Coventry Court,” underwent development in 2007. The appellants,
who live directly adjacent to this land, voiced complaints regarding the placement of a
fuel tank and portable toilet, circulated a petition against the development, and attended
council meetings where they voiced their opposition to the development.
The developer of the property irrevocably dedicated all streets in the proposed
development to the Borough of Trafford in late March 2007. On July 23, 2007,
engineering stakes were removed from part of the development located directly behind
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C § 1367. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review of a district court‟s order granting summary judgment. Shook v. Avaya,
Inc., 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2010). We also conduct de novo review of a district court‟s
legal conclusions. Id.
2

the appellants‟ home. The developer filed an incident report, and although the police
contacted the appellants regarding the matter, no official action was taken.
In early August 2007, the developers discovered that a pipe from the appellants‟
property emptied onto an area of Coventry Court that was slated to become a public
roadway. According to the developer, the discharge of this water prevented further
construction of the road, because it undermined the road‟s stability and would ultimately
cause it to collapse. Appellee Brian Lindbloom, the Borough‟s Code Enforcement
Officer, and appellee Craig Alexander, the Borough‟s Solicitor, contacted the appellants
regarding the situation, seeking to resolve the issue and avoid litigation. When these
efforts failed, appellee Alexander filed an equity action on behalf of the Borough of
Trafford on September 17, 2007, and when he notified the appellants of the matter he
also notified them the Borough would waive all fines and end the action if the appellants
would abate the water runoff. Despite statements by Mr. Chizmar that the condition was
fixed, it was not, and the equity action continued.
Appellee Lindbloom issued a non-traffic citation to the appellants daily regarding
the supposedly illegal discharge of water. The appellants prevailed on these alleged code
violations in front of a Pennsylvania District Magistrate. Meanwhile, in the equity action
a dye test was ordered by Judge Gary P. Caruso of the Court of Common Pleas for
Westmoreland County. Judge Caruso stated that if the dye test showed no violation of
the ordinances, then the equity action would be withdrawn. The tests, however, revealed
water from the appellants‟ property was in fact discharging onto the road area. The
Borough, through appellee Alexander, agreed with appellants‟ counsel and Judge Caruso
3

that the case would be withdrawn if the developer would resolve the issue by paying to
install a French drain. The developer did so, and the complaint was withdrawn.
The installation of the drain, however, led to another incident. Boulders were
placed on top of the drain to prevent damage from automobiles, and on the morning of
August 29, 2008, one of the boulders was found in the middle of the roadway. That
evening, appellee Frank Bruno, a member of the city council, stayed at night to observe
the area and stated that he witnessed Mr. Chizmar push a large rock from the drain onto
the roadway. Appellee Bruno notified both the Trafford police and appellee Alexander.
The Trafford police issued a non-traffic citation against Mr. Chizmar, charging him with
disorderly conduct. Mr. Chizmar was found guilty before a Pennsylvania District
Magistrate, but was found not guilty upon a summary appeal decided by Judge Richard
E. McCormick, Jr. of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County.
III.
The appellants set forth five claims in their complaint.2 Counts I, II, and IV are
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege violations of rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. Counts III and V allege violations under Pennsylvania state
law.3 Below we will set forth the claims in relation to appellees Bruno, Lindbloom, and
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The Borough of Trafford, Bruno, and Lindbloom were defendants below in all five
counts. Alexander was a defendant only in Counts II and III.
3
Appellants raise no arguments in their brief, or reply brief, regarding the dismissal of
the official capacity claims against appellees Bruno, Lindbloom, and Alexander, nor the
dismissal of the state law claims against the Borough of Trafford based on absolute
immunity. As a result, we do not address the District Court‟s ruling on these claims.
4

Alexander (the “individual appellees”), before turning to the liability of appellee Borough
of Trafford.4
1. The individual appellees did not violate the appellants’ constitutional
rights and did not violate Pennsylvania law.
a. The appellants‟ retaliation claims under § 1983.
“In general, constitutional retaliation claims are analyzed under a three-part test.
Plaintiff must prove (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the
government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the
retaliation.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).
Additionally, in a case such as this where a prosecution commenced, a plaintiff must
show the absence of probable cause. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006).
Given their actions in circulating petitions, and speaking at council meetings, the
appellants exercised protected First Amendment activity.5 The remaining elements will
be discussed below.
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After reviewing the briefs and the record below, we agree with the District Court‟s
reasoning and conclusion that the individual appellees are being sued individually, as
well as in their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14
(1985) (“[t]he course of proceedings” dictates the nature of the liability plaintiffs seek to
impose). Any immunity the appellees enjoy for actions taken in their official capacity
does not apply to the claims brought against the appellees in their individual capacities.
Additionally, Pennsylvania does not extend immunity to employees where their acts
constitute “a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. §8550 (West 2011). The term “willful misconduct” is synonymous with
“intentional tort.” Kuzel v. Krause, 658 A.2d 856, 859 (Pa. Commw. 1995).
5
The District Court accurately noted that this activity came after the placement of the
diesel fuel tank that forms part of Count I. Thus, for the underlying facts of Count I
related to that investigation, appellants fail to satisfy the first element of the analysis.
Mrs. Chizmar stated in her deposition that appellee Lindbloom said the portable toilets
5

Count I focuses on the citation for disorderly conduct that was given to Mr.
Chizmar, as well as essentially all other actions taken by the appellees in this matter,
including the equity action, the initial placement of the diesel tank, and the investigation
into the removal of property stakes. Count II focuses on the citation for violating
borough ordinances, and the resulting equity suit. Court IV focuses entirely on the
citation for disorderly conduct.
Turning to Count I, we agree with the District Court‟s analysis of the underlying
sequence of events. It is undisputed the appellants had water draining on the property
being developed, specifically on the location intended to become a public road. The
construction of the road could not continue if the condition was not corrected, and Mr.
Chizmar falsely told appellee Lindbloom that it had been corrected. This was despite
appellee Alexander telling the appellants that all fines would be waived, and the action
dropped, if the condition was corrected. It is clear from these facts, and the failure of the
appellants to demonstrate otherwise,6 that the attempts to enforce the municipal ordinance
were lawful (in both the form of the equity action, as well as the non-traffic citation), and

were placed in retaliation, but placing portable toilets on property owned by the
developer is not actionable.
6
The appellants rely upon testimony from Brett Lloyd, a rival of appellee Bruno on the
Borough of Trafford council, that appellee Bruno made statements to the effect that he
would cause the appellees legal problems for their complaints. Such alleged statements
would inculpate only appellee Bruno, not the other appellees. Even regarding appellee
Bruno, however, the appellants still cannot demonstrate that the alleged statements show
the legal actions were retaliatory, since the statements do not predate the Borough
notifying the appellants of what it believed was illegal water run-off.
6

not retaliatory. Consequently, the appellants fail to satisfy the second and third elements
of a retaliatory prosecution claim.7
Regarding the citation for disorderly conduct, even assuming arguendo that the
first three elements are satisfied, because there was a non-traffic citation and a summons
that resulted in a summary trial before a Pennsylvania District Magistrate, the appellants
must demonstrate a lack of probable cause.8 Given the judicial determination that Mr.
Chizmar was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the two separate incidents of the boulder
being pushed into the middle of the street, and appellee Bruno‟s testimony that he
witnessed Mr. Chizmar move the boulder, the appellants fail to show a lack of probable
cause.
Because Count II, regarding the equity action and the ordinance violation, and
Count IV, regarding the disorderly conduct citation, essentially restate components of the
facts underlying Count I, the above analysis of the elements of a retaliation claim applies.
Appellants simply do not set forth facts to satisfy the second and third elements of a
retaliation claim.
b. Appellants‟ claims under Pennsylvania state law.
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This is particularly true for the parts of Count I that arise from the police investigation
into the removal of the engineering stakes. The police were acting upon a report filed
with them by a manager from the construction site, and the appellants have demonstrated
no knowledge on the part of the appellees regarding the report.
8
We agree with the District Court‟s analysis below that the equity action was a civil
action, and not a criminal prosecution. Thus the appellants need not demonstrate the
absence of probable cause for the specific parts of Counts I and II arising from the equity
action.
7

Count III of the appellants‟ complaint accuses the appellees of committing the tort
of wrongful use of civil proceedings under Pennsylvania state law. This claim arises out
of the equity action filed by the Borough of Trafford. The tort applies to those who take
part in civil proceedings against another and requires demonstrating:
“(1) He act[ed] in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause and
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery,
joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
based; and
(2) The proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom
they are brought.”
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8351(a).
The first element clearly contains two sub-elements; one regarding the manner in
which the plaintiff acted, and the second regarding the plaintiff‟s purpose. See Schmidt v.
Currie, 470 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (noting improper purpose must be
shown in addition to acting in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause).
The appellants in the instant case fail to allege actions that violate either prong of
the statute. In their brief, appellants contend a jury could easily conclude the appellees
did not have probable cause and/or acted in a grossly negligent manner. The appellants
rely upon, (1) supposed mistakes made by the Borough‟s engineer, and appellee
Alexander, in the documents filed in the equity action, (2) testimony of their expert that
the filing was in bad faith, and (3) an email from appellee Alexander warning Mr.
Chizmar that litigation could arise as a result of further defaming comments.
This focus is misplaced, because it is undisputed that the appellants had a pipe
discharging water onto the land being developed. The legal conclusions that arise from
this fact are disputed by the parties, as evidenced by the fact that the equity suit was filed
8

and proceeded for some time, but irrelevant to the case at hand. The appellees made clear
at every step of the litigation that the equity action would be dropped if the drainage
condition was changed, and later that they would drop the action if the results of the dye
test showed there was in fact no drainage from the appellants‟ property. After reviewing
all of the facts, we agree with the District Court‟s conclusion, that even drawing all
inferences in the appellants favor, the jury could not reasonably find the appellees, in
bringing the equity action, had any other purpose than remedying the drainage problem
so that the proposed road would not be structurally compromised.
The appellants have also failed to show they satisfy the second element. Whether
a withdrawal of proceedings constitutes a favorable, final termination for the purposes of
a wrongful use suit is decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances
surrounding the withdrawal of the proceedings. D’Elia v. Folino, 933 A.2d 117, 122 (Pa.
Super. 2007). The withdrawal of proceedings stemming from a compromise does not
constitute, as a matter of law, a termination favorable to the plaintiff of the wrongful use
suit. Id. When the parties agree to end the suit without further litigation, the liability of
the appellees—here, those who acted on behalf of the Borough of Trafford in the equity
action—“is never determined with finality.” Id. at 123.
The appellants claim the equity action was terminated in their favor because they
asserted the developer was responsible for the drainage issue, and ultimately the
developer, not the appellants, rectified the situation by installing a new French drain. The
appellants further argue that the cases cited below by the District Court, D’Elia v. Folino,
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933 A.2d 117 (Pa. Super. 2007), and Rosenfield v. Pa. Auto. Ins. Plan, 636 A.2d 1138
(1994), only apply when consideration is given, or a settlement agreement is reached.
We agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that the agreement by the parties‟
attorneys ended the equity action. No monetary payment is required to demonstrate that
the parties had reached this final agreement. As a result, the party who “won” the equity
suit was never determined with finality.9 Thus, the appellants fail to satisfy the second
prong of the Pennsylvania statute for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
We now turn to Count V. Appellants‟ complaint accuses the appellees of
committing the tort of malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania state law. To prevail,
the appellants must prove (1) the appellees instituted proceedings against them, (2)
without probable cause, (3) with malice, and (4) the proceedings must have terminated in
favor of the appellants. Kelley v. General Teamsters Local 249, 544 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa.
1988). The appellants succeed in showing only the first element.
The appellants bear the burden of proving the lack of probable cause. Cosmas v.
Bloomingdales Bros., Inc., 660 A.2d 83, 86 (Pa. Super. 1995). “Probable cause is
defined as „. . . a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to
warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in believing that the party is guilty

9

The appellants‟ description of the events in the equity action is misleading. Appellants
argue the appellees were forced to undertake a “hasty retreat” “very soon” after Judge
Caruso‟s comments on June 18, 2008. But the statements were made at an evidentiary
hearing regarding an objection to proposed testimony, Joint Appendix at 195-97, and the
matter was not withdrawn until August 27, 2008, and was done with the agreement of the
appellants‟ attorney in the equity action. Joint Appendix, at 129, 142, 511, 514-15. Judge
Caruso never determined the issue as appellants contend.
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of the offense.‟” Id. (quoting Wright v. Schreffler, 618 A.2d 412, 414 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(omission in original)).
In the current case probable cause is clearly demonstrated by the judicial
determination that Mr. Chizmar was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the two separate
incidents of the boulder being pushed into the middle of the street, and appellee Bruno‟s
testimony that he witnessed Mr. Chizmar move the boulder. The alibi provided by Mrs.
Chizmar, and the subsequent reversal do not establish that the appellees lacked probable
cause given the facts just stated. The appellants therefore fail to show the appellees
lacked probable cause, which also precludes a finding of malice. Strickland v. Univ. of
Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 984 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“A showing of probable cause to
institute proceedings against a plaintiff establishes an absolute defense against an action
for malicious prosecution, which renders immaterial the issue of whether the prosecutor's
motive is malicious or otherwise.”).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting summary
judgment to the appellees as to Counts III and V.
2. Appellee Borough of Trafford is entitled to summary judgment
because the appellants have failed to demonstrate that any of the
appellees violated their constitutional rights.
The Borough of Trafford, as a municipality, can be subject to liability under §
1983 as a “person.” Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Startzell v.
City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2008). For a governmental entity to be liable
under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate either a “policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by [its] officers” or
11

“constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental „custom‟ even though such
custom has not received formal approval through the government's official
decisionmaking channels.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. This Court has stated a
municipal policy exists “when a „decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action‟ issues an official proclamation, policy, or
edict.” Watson v. Abington Twp, 478 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bielevicz v.
Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration in original)) . A municipal custom
exists where “a given course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized
by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.” Watson, 478 F.3d
at 156 (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850).
Again, we agree with the District Court‟s conclusion that summary judgment
should be granted in favor of appellees Bruno, Lindbloom, and Alexander on all counts.
Consequently, the appellants have failed to demonstrate either a municipal policy or
custom that led to violations of their constitutional rights. See Startzell, 533 F.3d at 204
(“Because we have found that there was no violation of Appellants‟ constitutional rights,
we need not reach the claim against the City under Monell. It too was properly
dismissed.”).
The Borough of Trafford is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
District Court‟s order granting the Borough of Trafford‟s motion for summary judgment
will be affirmed.
IV.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting the
appellees‟ motions for summary judgment on all claims.
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